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I. 
I ftred a third time. That was the shot that did 
for him. You could see the agony of it jolt his 
whole body and knock the last remnant of 
strength from his legs. But in falling he seemed 
for the moment to rise, for as his hind legs 
collapsed beneath him, he seemed to tower 
upward like a huge rock toppling, his trunk 
reaching skyward like a tree. He trumpeted, 
for the ftrst and only time. And then down he 
came, his belly toward me, with a crash that 
seemed to shake the ground even where I lay. 
George Orwell 
"Shooting an Elephant" 
I went to southern Africa to see the wild elephant. Of 
course, during my journey there were other matters of 
concern. But my underlying purpose was to encounter 
these giants directly, face to face. I was spurred on in 
this purpose by dismay, by an awareness of the 
calamitous decline of the elephant in East Africa. In 
the last few decades, Kenya had lost over 100,000 
elephants to poachers (David Western speech). Reports 
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from neighboring countries were equally discouraging. 
But in southern Africa, and particularly in Zimbabwe, 
the huge animals still prospered in great numbers. Here, 
I felt, I could encounter the wild elephant unthreatened 
by human greed and violence. 
But Zimbabwe, I soon discovered, was not a 
Peaceable Kingdom. Elephants had grown so abundant 
in past years that their numbers had been reduced by 
systematicculling. The practice ofculling began as early 
as 1965, when Zimbabwe was still called Southern 
Rhodesia, and has since become an established practice 
(Martin and Conybeare 7). This culling process, from 
my perspective, is as brutal as poaching, although park 
authorities claim it is done as humanely as possible. In 
culling elephants, the matriarch is shot ftrst. Elephant 
families, composed of females and the young of both 
sexes, are led by older females, on whose accumulated 
wisdom of waterholes, food sources and incipient 
dangers the entire family depends. When the matriarch 
is shot, the family is thrown into confusion, and can be 
rapidly decimated. Douglas Chadwick, in The Fate of 
the Elephant, reports that in one incident, three 
professional hunters were able to kill ninety-eight 
elephants in one minute (431). Only calves, between 
one and three years, young enough not to be traumatized 
by the slaughter of their families, are spared; afterwards 
they are sold to zoos (Moss 229). One rationale for 
shooting entire families is that "dead men tell no tales." 
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If there are no survivors, consternation about the 
slaughter will not spread to the general population of 
elephants. But even park authorities point out that the 
recently discovered phenomenon of infrasound 
undercuts this rationale. Joyce, Payne has discovered 
that elephants communicate at frequencies lower than 
the human ear can distinguish, and these frequencies 
can travel up to six miles (Martin and Conybeare 35). 
All this suggests that elephants, even those not marked 
for slaughter, are aware of the process, often come to 
investigate the killings (Chadwick 432), and avoid 
waterholes during daylight hours after a culling has 
taken place there (Martin and Conybeare 35). 
There are several reasons put forth for culling in 
Zimbabwe. R. D. Taylor and D. H. M. Cumming argue 
that culling elephants must be seen against the "regional 
background of widespread deforestation and land 
degradation" (14). The elephants' proclivity for tearing 
down and devouring trees has brought him into this 
disrepute. Hwange National Park shows considerable 
degradation around waterholes. And zambesi National 
Park evidences mopane trees with missing tops and 
downed baobabs, damage attributed to elephants. This 
damage, it is argued, could very well affect other species 
dependent on forest habitats, thus adversely affecting 
biodiversity in the parks (Martin and Conybeare 27). 
Another argument in favor of culling is raised by 
Martin and Conybeare. "The primary reason given here 
for selecting 'culling' as the option is aesthetic. We wish 
to see Zimbabwe's national heritage of national (sic) 
ecosystems within the Parks and Wildlife Estates 
preserved in the pristine state in which they existed 
fIfteen years ago" (x). The same authors speak of the 
"alarming loss of mature trees" and the possible decline 
of "savana and forest species" (5) as ajustification for 
the shooting of elephants, but they state unequivocally 
that "the matter of elephant culling finally falls under 
the heading of an aesthetic decision" (3). Again they 
say, "elephant densities have caused an aesthetically 
unpleasing loss of woodlands" (27). 
There are two arguments being presented here, one 
ecological and the other aesthetic. I fmd I have very 
strong reservations about the second reason. "The scenic 
qualities of the landscape" (Martin and Conybeare 3) 
for which elephants were being shot do not seem readily 
apparent to me. The landscape in Hwange and much of 
zambesi National Park consists of scrub woodlands on 
mostly flattish terrain, and strikes many observers as 
dull and monotonous. What makes the parks so 
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interesting is not scenery but rather an abundance of 
animals and birds. On reflection, I concluded that I 
certainly would not make the journey to Africa to see 
the mopane or the baobab tree, but I did indeed travel 
there to see the wild elephant. 
At first, the ecological argument seemed to me far 
more cogent. Since population pressures have forced 
more and more elephants into confined areas, they are 
causing great environmental stress because of their 
excessive numbers. I had in the past accepted the 
culling of deer in order to preserve suburban forest 
preserves. Whey then am I so troubled about the 
shooting of elephants in Zimbabwe? After all, are there 
not strong parallels here with the Land Ethic of AIdo 
Leopold? Did not Leopold call for the preservation of 
the integrity, stability and beauty of the land? (Leopold 
262) Weren't the Zimbabwe national park officials 
merely putting Leopold's ideas in practice? Any doubts 
I may have had about this parallel to Leopold were 
dispelled in a conversation with Dr. R. D. Taylor, 
ecologist for the World Wide Fund for Nature in Harare. 
Taylor remarked that AIdo Leopold was one of his 
personal heroes, and that the wildlife management 
practices in Zimbabwe were consistent with Leopold's 
principles (Taylor interview). 
It was Pascal who said that the heart has reasons the 
mind knows not of. Perhaps this aphorism was all too 
appropriate for me. I fully grasped on a cognitive level 
the cogency of the argument for preserving biodiversity. 
I clearly understood no animal can prosper if it destroys 
its own habitat and that of other species. Yet I found I 
could not resign myself to the idea ofculling elephants. 
It became clear that my trip into Africa was not just a 
physical journey, nor was it that kind of adventure that 
expands one's horizons and broadens one's vision of 
the world. Rather, I began to understand I was on a sort 
of intellectual journey, in which I was being forced to 
question some of my fundamental notions about the 
role of humans in the natural world. 
n. 
Intellectual perplexity can be likened to descending 
darkness, or fog, or stonny weather, or some other apt 
metaphor. For some, clarity comes in a flash of 
inspiration. For others, like me, it is more a process of 
muddling through, of groping one's way towards an 
impending dawn. Thus it was only gradually, in the 
midst of my journey into Africa, that I began to 
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understand why shooting elephants in Zimbabwe caused 
me such disquiet. 
One cause of my uneasiness, I discovered, is the 
apparent commercial attitude found in the wildlife 
management practices in Zimbabwe. Outside of the 
parks, wild animals are regarded as akin to maize and 
tobacco; they can be "harvested," "cropped," or "culled" 
like any commercial commodity. Following this 
agricultural metaphor, wildlife can be regarded as a 
sustainable crop; in this way, animals can and should 
pay their own way. This submerged metaphor informs 
the praiseworthy CAMPFIRE program, whereby people 
living in communal lands are given the right to manage 
wildlife on their lands. By making a small percentage 
of wild animals available for safari hunting, communal 
peoples can acquire yearly profits from wealthy hunters 
willing to spend in excess of $50,000 U.S. for the 
opportunity to shoot trophy animals (Chadwick 440). 
Buteven protected elephants in national parks, when 
they are culled, can yield profits. Meat. hides and ivory 
have commercial value. Especially ivory. This was a 
major reason why Zimbabwe vigorously opposed the 
CITES agreement of 1989, by which an overwhehning 
majority ofnations agreed to ban the international ivory 
trade (Bonner 157). The CITES ban may have saved 
the East African elephant from extinction, as David 
Western, head of the Kenya Wildlife Service, claimed 
in a speech in Harare. But since ivory can no longer be 
sold on the international market. in Zimbabwe it meant 
that the elephant is no longer paying his way. 
It is notjust this commercial attitude toward wildlife 
that I fmd disturbing. There is something else even more 
fundamental underlying this attitude, a presumption 
about nature that is profoundly anthropocentric. Wildlife 
has only extrinsic value; it should be used for human 
benefit. As Taylor and Cumming phrase it. "Wildlife 
should be used sustainably... in the service of man" (1). 
Thus the elephant should be used for its meat. hide and 
ivory. It should be valued for its contribution to tourism 
"in the service of man." But it does not have intrinsic 
value; for Taylor and Cumming, it is not valued for its 
own sake. As the ecohistorian Robert Delort puts it, 
the elephant in Asia is revered as the god Ganesha, 
but in Africa it is generally regarded as "a mountain 
of meat" (69). 
And so these thoughts percolated in my conscious-
ness as I fmally setout to see the elephants themselves, 
first at Hwange National Park, where they are overly 
abundant at waterholes, and then at Zambesi National 
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Park. At Hwange, in particular, I felt a deep uneasiness. 
Park officials believe there are simply too many 
elephants there. I encountered a wide range ofestimates, 
from 22,000 to 40,000, but the most commonly 
mentioned estimate is around 35,000 elephants. This 
is three times greater than what is believed to be the 
carrying capacity of the park. Culling has not taken 
place for a few years now, but clearly the pressures 
for again shooting elephants in Zimbabwe is growing. 
Rumors abound about cullings that were anticipated and 
then postponed. Any number of people I spoke with 
said something must be done about all these elephants. 
And in the past. that which has been done has been 
shooting them. 
What was it about these creatures that caused me so 
much concern? When I finally encountered them in the 
wild, I began to gain some insight into my uneasiness. 
Perhaps one could call it a kind of recognition, such as 
some people experience in their encounters with whales 
and dolphins. I recognized in the wild elephant a fellow 
creature, an intelligent and curious being whose 
behavior was not so distant from my own. Like Seneca, 
I realized that this creature had "a fellowship with the 
human race." (qtd in Deport 89) I already knew that, 
like human behavior, much elephantbehavior is learned, 
and this learned behavior reveals a remarkable 
intelligence. Chadwick gives many instances of 
elephant intelligence. In one example, he tells ofAsian 
work elephants who were forced to wear a bell in order 
to reveal their whereabouts after a night of foraging. 
These clever animals learned to stuff their bells with 
mud in order to escape detection and extend their 
foraging time (289). Cynthia Moss, whose study of the 
Amboseli elephants spans more than twenty years, 
records the deep and affectionate bonds that pervade 
matriarchal families. She describes the elaborate 
greeting ceremony involving the intertwining of trunks, 
and records their evidentjoy when family members are 
united after even a short separation (102, 105). Calves, 
according to Moss, are regarded with great concern by 
the females of the family, and are raised in a caring 
environment. Oddly, elephant family structure bears 
more evident similarity to the African communal 
extended family than to the American dysfunctional one. 
Moss points out a similarity to human feelings, claiming 
she has seen elephants evidence playfulness, terror and 
even silliness (65). Chadwick reports that captive 
elephants have been known to weep under stress (327). 
Of course some may worry about anthropomorphism 
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in this kind of talk about elephants, fearing that human 
feelings are being read into animal behaviors. But 
perhaps the only way to fully enter into the life of 
intelligent and sentient animals is to make the leap, as 
Moss does, from observable animal behavior to 
obvious parallels in human experience. Not only must 
one think like a mountain, as Leopold said, but here, 
to understand elephant behavior, perhaps one must 
think like an elephant. 
There is one elephant behavior, however, that Moss 
and other field observers have recorded as being 
haunting and uncanny. When an elephant dies, other 
elephants will often remain with it for hours and even 
days (Moss 278). Often they attempt to bury the dead 
elephant with branches and debris (Chadwick 121). 
Sometimes they return to the skeleton of the dead animal 
and touch the bones and tusks in a lingering manner 
(Moss 235). What is transpiring in the minds of these 
giants at these times? Most observers hesitate to offer 
an explanation. Whatever may be happening, this 
behavior suggests that elephants are feeling creatures 
who have some sort of awareness of death. 
Given what we know about these intelligent animals, 
how then can we continue to treat them as commodities, 
having only extrinsic worth? How can we continue to 
value them only for their meat, hide, ivory, and capacity 
to amuse tourists? These elephants are clearly 
intelligent, feeling creatures. Like humans, they must 
learn from experience, and in this sense can be said to 
acquire wisdom. There may be truth in the idea of the 
wise old elephant. They have a form ofcommunication, 
inaudible to human ears. They develop strong family 
bonds, show affection toward one another, and evidence 
great concern for their young. They even have some 
sort of an awareness of death. They have in simpler 
form many of the behaviors we value in humans, and 
which are often said to give humans intrinsic worth. If 
humans are valued for their own sakes for these reasons, 
then on what grounds can intrinsic worth be denied in 
elephants? They should indeed be valued for their own 
sakes, not because their bodies can yield carved ivory 
and elephant foot umbrella stands "in the service of 
man." These giants have a right, or at least an interest, 
to live and flourish within the limits of nature. 
m. 
What then did I learn from this intellectual journey into 
Africa? Clearly I came away from Zimbabwe with much 
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anxiety that the shooting of elephants would resume 
And if it did resume, I believe it would be lamentable, 
since these giants are, in my estimation, creatures 
possessing intrinsic worth because they are in so many 
ways similar to humans. Chadwick, in fact, raises this 
issue in The Fate of the Elephant. Discussing the 
similarity ofemotions and social relationships between 
species, he remarks, "If a continuum exists between us 
and such beings in terms ofanatomy, physiology, social 
behavior and intelligence, it follows that there should 
be some continuum of moral standards" (475). Of 
course, it was Peter Singer who argued for such a 
continuum of moral standards in Animal Liberation, 
although he did stress sentience rather than intrinsic 
worth. Nonetheless, if one applies Singer's arguments 
to elephants rather than to laboratory or factory farm 
animals, one could argue that elephants deserve to be 
treated with the same moral consideration we would 
accord humans who are at comparable mental level 
(Singer 22). Chadwick points out that the mental level 
of elephants is comparable to that of these humans 
when he states that a "surprising number of handlers 
compared working with elephants to working with 
mentally handicapped people" (17). We would think 
it horrendous to cull mentally handicapped humans in 
order to reduce the pressure of the human species on 
the natural environment. How then can we justify 
culling elephants, who are at a comparable mental level? 
Reflections such as these underscore Cynthia Moss's 
feelings. She expresses her fears powerfully: "And if 
the poachers do not come, what of the cullers? 1 feel 
sick when I think of a team of marksmen, skinners and 
butchers moving into Amboseli and slaughtering whole 
families along with all their knowledge, their traditions, 
and their memories" (278). 
Of course, to those who practice aggressive 
wildlife management, the answer to this question is 
patently obvious. The mentally handicapped do not 
inflict extensive damage on the natural environment, 
while elephants do. The questions of land degradation 
and threatened biodiversity, they would reply, still 
remain unanswered. 
Ultimately, I would have to reply that I would prefer 
to let nature take its course rather than see the shooting 
of elephants in Zimbabwe resume. Delayed birth, 
drought, even starvation will doubtless bring the 
elephant into equilibrium with its habitat. Of course, 
the price may be high. Elephants might convert much 
of the forest into savannas, as they have in the past. 
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Forest species may decline as grassland species expand. 
The "loss of entire woodlands and loss of valuable 
species" may occur, as Martin and Conybeare fear (5). 
At what point such degradation would occur is, 
however, unknown. Ecology is a young science, and 
perhaps not yet adequately developed to predict 
precisely what would happen if there were no shooting 
of elephants. Taylor and Cumming claim that 
"authorities argue that elephants may take systems 
across thresholds that cannot be recovered... however, 
neither the threshold nor whether the change is 
irreversible is known" (14). Moss questions the wisdom 
of culling, calling it "a drastic, unreasoned step, given 
our present lack ofknowledge of ecosystem dynamics" 
(271). Western, faced with the overpopulation of 
elephants in Amboseli, said the choice is to cull or to 
move, and unequivocally advocated translocation of the 
giants as an alternative to shooting them (speech). 
When elephants and trees come in conflict, 
authorities disagree radically. And when the fmal result 
of shooting elephants is uncertain, when it is a matter 
of dispute among ecologists, perhaps it is time to avoid 
violent and aggressive solutions until greater under-
standing of ecosystems, over time, is achieved. That is 
to say, perhaps it is better at this time to just let nature 
be. What I am advocating here is a more modest and 
less violent attitude toward nature in general and toward 
elephants in particular. Perhaps it is an act of human 
hubris to assume that humans know what is best for 
nature, and perhaps it is an act of arrogance to promote 
a violent solution when the outcome of one's actions is 
uncertain and disputable. 
The need for modesty and nonviolence was brought 
home to me on a personal level by my last encounter 
with the giants. I was on foot, following the shoreline 
of the zambesi River, looking for birds, and not even 
thinking about elephants. Without any warning, I found 
myself confronting two massive bulls that suddenly 
emerged in the foliage. Although I was only one hundred 
paces from these huge creatures, I did not feel I was in 
any danger, since they regarded me with considerable 
indifference. Without an elephant gun, without a safari 
van to escape in, without even enough presence ofmind 
to use my camera, I stood there, defenseless and 
vulnerable. I realized, confronted by these magnificent 
animals, that my place in the natural scheme of things 
was indeed modest. Standing there, I could no longer 
think anthropocentrically, imagining myself as the 
<:enter of nature, with the power of life and death over 
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these creatures. Of course I did admire these giants for 
their human-like qualities, for their intelligence, their 
playfulness, their affectionate natures, their evident 
conscious awareness. But I was beginning to suspect 
that these characteristics were not uniquely human but 
rather part of a common inheritance we shared with 
other members of the animal kingdom. The point was 
not that they were like us. No, the point was that we 
were like them. 
An anthropocentric perspective had distorted my 
view of animals in the past. But this intellectual 
journey into Africa had indeed transformed my view 
of nature. I was beginning to think ecocentrically, in a 
nature-centered way. The elephants had taught me on 
the level of lived experience something I had learned 
theoretically from Aldo Leopold years ago. I was not 
the master of nature; rather I was, and should be, a 
mere citizen. 
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